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Cloud Peak Energy v. Montana Department of Revenue; Defining the 




No. DA 14-0057 
 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Tuesday, November 25, 2014, at 9:30 a.m. in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana.  
 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Is the market value of coal sold under non-arm’s-length (“NAL”) 
agreements best determined (i) through a comparison of arm’s-length 
sales agreements negotiated during the same time period or (ii) by 
comparing actual coal sale prices from the time of the coal’s extraction 
from the earth? 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
 
The Plaintiff and Appellee, Cloud Peak Energy (“CPE”), 
operates a coal-mining business known as Spring Creek Coal, LLC, in 
Big Horn County, Montana. In July 2008, the Montana Department of 
Revenue (“Department”) audited CPE’s coal-production taxes for the 
period 2005–2007. After completing the audit, the Department provided 
proposed adjustments to CPE’s coal-production taxes and the parties 
resolved several, but not all, of the identified auit issues.  
One of the remaining audit issues concerned the value of coal 
that CPE sold in NAL agreements to its affiliated business entities 
“Venture Fuels” and “Northern Coal Transportation Company.” Coal is 
often sold below market value in NAL agreements, but Montana’s coal-
production tax is based on coal’s present market value, which is not 
always reflected in NAL agreements. To account for this reality and 
ensure proper valuations for tax purposes, both Montana and federal law 
provide mechanisms to impute the value of coal soldbe ow market value 
in NAL agreements.  
                                         
1 The facts presented in this section are drawn from two documents: (1) Opening Br. of 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee State of Montana, Departmen  of Revenue, Cloud Peak Energy 
Resources, LLC v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue at **3–6 (Mont. April 17, 2014) (No. DA 14-0057) 
(hereinafter Opening Br. of Appellant); and (2) Opening Br. of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Cloud 
Peak Energy Resources, LLC, loud Peak Energy Resources, LLC v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue at 
**2–9 (Mont. June 13, 2014) (No. DA 14-0057) (hereinafter Opening Br. of Appellee).  
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For federal royalty purposes, CPE determines the market value 
of its NAL coal sales pursuant to a federal settlement agreement between 
CPE’s predecessor (Kennecott) and the Federal Mineral Management 
Service. Per the express terms of the agreement, the market valuation 
method outlined in the agreement only applies for federal royalty 
purposes. Following this federal royalty valuation method to compute 
coal’s current market value, CPE compares each NAL agreement with 
the company’s average arm’s-length transaction prices for the given 
month. If the NAL sale price is lower than the average arm’s-length 
price, CPE imputes revenue income equal to the arm’s-length average. 
CPE does not make a downward adjustment if the NAL sale price is 
higher than the average arm’s-length price. Following this valuation 
method, CPE deducted the previously mentioned federal royalties on its 
Montana Coal Production Tax Returns to reduce its Montana tax 
liability.  
On March 13, 2012, the Department issued a deficiency 
assessment for the additional taxes due from the below-market NAL 
sales. The Department adopted CPE’s market value calculation from the 
federal settlement agreement, but CPE pointed to the express terms of the 
agreement and argued said agreement should not be used to approximate 
market values for Montana tax purposes.  
Before the Department issued a Final Agency Decision, CPE 
filed a complaint in Montana’s First Judicial Distrc  seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the Department erred in relying on CPE’s 
Federal Settlement to assess additional Montana coal taxes.  
The Department considered the position outlined in CPE’s 
complaint and conducted a market study to impute the value of the NAL 
coal sales instead of relying on CPE’s calculations. The Department’s 
methodology in imputing the NAL coal sale values for state tax purposes 
was very similar to the method found in CPE’s Federal Settlement. This 
application of the federal settlement agreement resulted in an additional 
$3,369,713 of tax burden for CPE. 
Judge Sherlock of the First Judicial District granted summary 
judgment to the Department on the issue of determinatio  of additional 
revenue; and granted summary judgment to CPE on the issue of the 
Department’s decision to include certain additives in its calculation of 
the sale price. Both parties appealed. 
 
III.  ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’  BRIEFS 
 
A. The Montana Department of Revenue’s argument on appeal: 
 
1. For Montana tax purposes, the imputed value of the coal sold 
in CPE’s NAL agreements should be the coal’s market value at the time 
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it is extracted from the earth and prepared for shipment.2 The Department 
argues that “Montana Coal Production taxes attach when the coal is 
‘produced,’” meaning extracted from the earth.3 Therefore, the 
Department correctly imputed the market value of CPE’s NAL 
agreements by comparing average values of similar arm’s-length sales 
during the same time period. The Department notes CPE uses this exact 
formulation to impute NAL sale values for federal royalty purposes and 
argues the market value should be the same for both federal and state 
purposes.  
2. The District Court misinterpreted Montana law and 
erroneously concluded the value of CPE’s NAL agreemnts should be 
determined using the market value of contemporaneously negotiated 
arm’s-length sales.4 The District Court misinterpreted the definition of 
“time of sale” as contemplated in Decker Coal Company v. Department 
of Revenue5 because Montana Coal Production taxes are determind from 
the “price of coal extracted and prepared for shipment.”6 Under Montana 
statute,7 the Department is required to determine the value of NAL 
agreements “at the time of sale” rather than the time of negotiation 
because negotiations often occur long before “the NAL coal in question 
[is] extracted.”8 The Department concludes the Legislature clearly 
intended to tax the production of coal at the time of xtraction; therefore, 
the District Court’s erroneous interpretation of Montana law should be 
reversed.  
 
B. Plaintiff and Appellee CPE’s argument on appeal: 
 
1. CPE argues the District Court properly imputed the value of 
NAL coal sales by using similar arm’s-length contrac s negotiated during 
the same time period. CPE argues the Department’s valuation 
methodology is flawed because it (1) does not take prevailing market 
conditions into account at the time of the NAL agreem nt, (2) produces 
anomalous results, and (3) yields “widely divergent ‘market’ prices for 
coal sold under the same contract.” As noted by the Montana Supreme 
Court in Decker, NAL valuations require comparisons of arm’s-length 
contracts “negotiated in the same time frame” as the instant agreement.9 
CPE argues valuations relying on other time periods may produce 
anomalous results than can “nearly double” the price of similar arm’s-
                                         
2 Opening Br. of Appellant, supra n. 1, at *15. 
3 Id. at *9 (citing Mont Code Ann. §§ 15–23–701; 15–35–103; 15–38–103 (2013)). 
4 Id. at *15. 
5 2 P.3d 245 (Mont. 2000). 
6 Opening Br. of Appellant, supra n. 1, at *9 (citing Mont Code Ann. §§ 15–23–701; 15–3 –103; 
15–38–103, Decker, 2 P.3d at 257). 
7 Mont. Code Ann. § 15–35–107. 
8 Opening Br. of Appellant, supra n. 1, at **9, 13 (citing Decker, 2 P.3d at 252). 
9 Opening Br. of Appellee, supra n. 1, at **18–19 (citing Decker, 2 P.3d at 250). 
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length transactions.10 The introduction of such an unpredictable valuation 
methodology will lead to “widely divergent” NAL prices that do not 
accurately reflect coal’s fair market value for taxpurposes and will lead 
to improper price fluctuations in otherwise identical purchase contracts.11  
2. CPE argues the Department’s valuation methodology has 
significant practical ramifications that yield “artificially high and 
artificially low” revenues for tax purposes.12 Here, CPE’s imputed 
revenue from 2005–2007 “greatly exceeds the revenues CPE ‘could 
have’ received from arm’s-length sales.”13 Equally problematic, the 
Department’s valuations that occur in periods of economic decline will 
understate revenues and deprive Montana of significa t amounts of coal 
taxes in applicable NAL sales.14  
3. In response to the Department’s reliance upon a federal 
settlement agreement to calculate federal royalties, CPE argues the 
agreement does not apply to the instant case because the express terms of 
the agreement preclude “application of its terms to M ntana Coal 
Taxes.”15  
4. In its cross appeal, CPE argues the District Court erred in 
applying Montana statute16 to coal mined before June 30, 2009 because 
the statute is strictly limited to “coal mined after June 30, 2009.”17 The 
statutory provision defines “prepared for shipment” for coal mined after 
June 30, 2009. CPE argues the Department improperly applied this 
definition to “impose taxes on [coal] additives forthe time period 2005–
2007.”18 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
This case presents an interesting question that will like y provide 
definitive guidance outlining the procedure required to impute revenue in 
future NAL coal sale agreements. The most important issue in this case 
concerns the timing of NAL coal sale price valuations. The Department 
favors a system that compares actual contemporaneous sale prices19 
while CPE favors one that compares prices negotiated in 
contemporaneous arm’s-length sales contracts.20 While these methods 
may seem extremely similar, this case illustrates the radically different 
tax consequences that can result from the two different approaches. In 
                                         
10 Id. at *20. 
11 Id. at **19–20. 
12 Id. at **26–31. 
13 Id. at *20. 
14 Id. at *12. 
15 Opening Br. of Appellee, supra n. 1, at *32. 
16 Mont. Code Ann. § 15–35–107. 
17 Opening Br. of Appellee, supra n. 1, at *37. 
18 Id. at *36. 
19 Opening Br. of Appellant, supra n. 1, at **8–9. 
20 Opening Br. of Appellee, supra n. 1, at **17–19. 
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addition to the immediate tax burden at issue, thisca e also presents 
important policy considerations that must be carefully weighed by the 
Court.21 Specifically, the Court must weigh the significant short-term 
loss of tax revenue presented by CPE’s disputed tax burden against the 
potentially problematic precedent created if the Court adopts the 
Department’s valuation method. 
While the Department’s argument has obvious merits, CPE 
presents a compelling argument identifying a potential flaw in the 
Department’s valuation methodology. CPE correctly argues NAL coal 
sales are the result of previously negotiated agreements that often occur 
months, if not years before the actual sale.22 While parties may attempt to 
predict future market prices and factor these predictions into their 
agreements, these attempts are simply conjecture until present-day 
market conditions reveal the actual market price. Bcause of this reality, 
the Department’s reliance upon current sale prices a tually utilizes dated 
prices that merely reflect market values in past negotiations. As noted by 
CPE, these dated prices may not accurately reflect coal’s current market 
value, which may result in both overstated and understated tax burdens.23 
If the Court finds merit in CPE’s claim, these inaccuracies have no place 
in Montana tax law and the Court should be hesitant to create 
problematic precedent that will lead to inaccurate pplications in future 
cases. Uniform application and predictable results are crucial 
requirements in tax law and any action that may introduce uncertainty 
should be treated with utmost caution.  
 
 
Lower Court: Lewis and Clark County Cause No. BDV201 -239, 
Honorable Jeffery M. Sherlock, District Court Judge of the First Judicial 
District, Lewis and Clark County.  
 
Attorneys for the Petitioner: Brendan R. Beatty and Courtney Jenkins, 
Special Assistant Attorneys General, Montana Departmen  of Revenue. 
 
Attorneys for the Respondent: Robert L. Sterup and Kyle Anne Gray, 




                                         
21 See Mont. Code Ann. § 15–35–101 for a statement of the policy behind the Coal Severance Tax 
(distinguishing coal from metal minerals as well as from petroleum for tax purposes; seeking a tax 
that is a “constant percentage” of the price of coal; seeking to stabilize tax revenue from coal; and 
simplifying the “structure of coal taxation”). 
22 Opening Br. of Appellee, supra n. 1, at **24–25. 
23 Opening Br. of Appellee, supra n. 1, at *22. 
